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ABSTRACT
With the crash of the financial market, the effectiveness of
“bankruptcy remote” provisions has been tested and examined. In
the recent case of In re General Growth Properties, the court
allowed a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity to voluntarily
file for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code along with
its related corporate entities, despite the fact that bankruptcy remote
provisions are designed to avoid precisely this result. This Note
analyzes the General Growth decision and explores its potential
future implications for the special purpose entity as a securitization
tool. While General Growth casts doubt on the viability of special
purpose entities, a careful examination of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the opinion sheds light on how
bankruptcy remote provisions can remain effective by following
proper procedural precautions.
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INTRODUCTION
The creation of a bankruptcy remote “special purpose entity” or
“special purpose vehicle,” (hereinafter “SPE”) has been a longstanding
valuable securitization tool, protecting lenders from the financial risks of
large commercial borrowers. Corporations generally set up a subsidiary
in the form of a SPE to separate the ownership of an asset from the risk
associated with its financing. A SPE is generally designed to be
“bankruptcy remote” so that it is difficult for a majority of board
members or managing members of a business to put it into bankruptcy.1
Recent case law casts doubt as to whether the SPE securitization model
is still effective. This doubt arises from the recent Chapter 11 case of In

1. In describing a bankruptcy remote entity, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board has explained: “the special-purpose corporation is designed to make remote the
possibility that it would enter bankruptcy, either by itself or by substantive
consolidation into a bankruptcy of its parent should that occur. For example, its charter
forbids it from undertaking any other business or incurring any liabilities, so that there
can be no creditors to petition to place it in bankruptcy. Furthermore, its dedication to a
single purpose is intended to make it extremely unlikely, even if it somehow entered
bankruptcy, that a receiver under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code could reclaim the
transferred assets because it has no other assets to substitute for the transferred assets.”
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 140, App. A, ¶83(c).
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re General Growth Properties (“GGP”), in which a voluntary
bankruptcy petition was filed by a bankruptcy remote SPE.2
This Note discusses securitization through SPEs and the
effectiveness of bankruptcy remote provisions. Part I discusses the effect
of the SPE structure, a SPE’s characteristics, and standard bankruptcy
remote provisions. Part I also explains why SPEs are valuable
securitization methods and describes the risks they intend to mitigate.
Part II discusses the potential legal challenges that may be brought
against a SPE and the risks lenders face by participating in such a
transaction. Part III addresses the effectiveness of Bankruptcy Remote
Provisions against voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy filings,
focusing on the recent GGP opinion. Part IV examines the consequences
of the GGP decision and its predicted effect on future SPE financing.
Finally, Part V concludes by outlining the proper protective measures a
transferor should take in creating a SPE to ensure that the securitization
survives potential challenges.
I. SPES GENERALLY
A. WHAT IS A SPE?
A SPE is an independent legal entity that can be used to mitigate
the disruption caused by a bankruptcy filing by all or some of the
members of a corporate group.3 It is therefore an essential element of
securitization.4 SPEs are structured so that investors are protected from
the credit risk of the loan originator or servicer, also known as the
“sponsor” or “transferor.”5 Essentially, a lender may be more inclined to
provide a secured loan to an independent entity rather than to a complex
corporate group with several creditors. Generally, a SPE is created when
the transferor transfers ownership of some income producing assets,
such as equity generating income or mortgages generating payments, to
2.
3.

409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)
See Stuart M. Saft, Refinancing a Discounted Indebtedness: Special Purpose
Entities, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE WORKOUTS § 7:33 (3d ed.) (2010).
4. CHARLES R. GIBBS ET AL., MORTGAGE AND ASSET BACKED SECURITIES
LITIGATION HANDBOOK § 7:3 (2010).
5. Marcia L. Goldstein et. al., General Growth Properties: Are BankruptcyRemote Entities in Fact Bankruptcy-Remote?, 2010 AM. BANKR. INST. 187; see
generally Sheryl A. Gussett, Bankruptcy Remote Entities in Structured Financings, 15
MAR. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 15 (1996) (discussing means of creating the SPE and
whether an entity can truly be bankruptcy remote).
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a SPE.6 An SPE achieves bankruptcy remote status through governance
provisions and restrictive covenants. Ideally, the SPE will be a newly
created corporation, limited liability company, partnership, nonprofit,
business trust, or limited liability partnership.7 While tax considerations
largely determine which type of entity will be ideal, most commonly,
SPEs are either limited partnerships or limited liability companies.8
The effect of this structure is to separate the credit quality of the
assets being securitized from the credit risk of any other entity involved
in the financing.9 Isolating the assets makes the financing more
attractive to a lender by lessening potential risk.10 This separation is
achieved by structuring the sale of assets between the transferor and the
SPE as a “true sale” between the parties rather than as a transfer of a
security interest in the assets.11 After a true sale of the assets, the
transferor is left with no legal or equitable interest in the assets.12 If the
transferor later files for bankruptcy, the transferred assets will not be
included as part of the transferor’s estate; and investors who are secured
by the SPE’s assets are not at risk of losing any part of their security
interest.
Corporate governance provisions and restrictive covenants
generally ensure that the SPE will be bankruptcy remote. This structure
prevents the SPE from becoming a debtor in bankruptcy and also
protects the SPE’s assets from the bankruptcy of a related corporate
entity.13 Bankruptcy remote provisions are often found in the SPE’s
charter or bylaws.14 The SPE’s corporate documents will generally
contain restrictive provisions requiring that the SPE be limited to its

6. Baxter Dunaway, Law of Distressed Real Estate, Special Purpose Entity
(SPE/SPV) and Bankruptcy Remoteness, 4 LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 56:4
(2010).
7. “In some states this will result in the payment of a substantial transfer tax and
an alternative will be to use an existing entity which is restructured to meet the
bankruptcy remoteness requirements.” Id. at § 56:29.
8. Id. at § 56:55.
9. Id. at § 56:27.
10. Saft, supra note 3.
11. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:4, :27.
12. See id.
13. Id. § 56:27.
14. See, e.g., Katherine D. Kale, Securitizing the Enterprise: Enterprise Liability
and Transferred Receivables in Bankruptcy, 20 BANKR. DEV. J. 311, 319 (2003).
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stated purpose of holding the collateral assets, therefore restricting it
from engaging in outside activities.15
Additionally, restrictive covenants ensure the borrower’s status as a
SPE. These covenants often prohibit the borrower from (1) engaging in
business other than to operate the collateral; (2) owning property other
than the collateral; (3) merging with another entity or acquiring any
subsidiary; (4) incurring other debt (with exceptions of ordinary course
trade payables and equipment financing); (5) co-mingling assets with
affiliates; and (6) guaranteeing the debt of an affiliate or pledging its
assets to secure the debt of another.16 These covenants limit the SPE’s
powers to activities necessary to operate the structured transaction.17
Additional activities may include things such as permitting the SPE to
incur debt for future real estate taxes and/or additional covenants
contained in easements and other matters of public record.18 If one
lender wishes to secure loans on multiple properties, the SPE may be
designed to operate all the relevant properties. However, if the borrower
wishes to change management or sell any of the relevant properties,
lender approval will be required.19 These limits preclude the SPE from
engaging in operations outside the asset securitization, thus reducing the
risk of the SPE becoming insolvent.20
In addition, a SPE’s bankruptcy remote provisions will also
generally require that in order to file for bankruptcy voluntarily, there
must be unanimous consent of the SPE’s directors or partners with an
“independent” director, partner, or managing member of the SPE (the
“independent director requirement”).21 The independent director
requirement prevents common directors of the SPE and the SPE’s parent
entity from submitting a solvent SPE to bankruptcy solely for the parent
entity’s advantage.22 The independent director is often designated by the
lender and can presumably veto any suggestion of the SPE filing a
15.
16.

Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:52.
Michael T. Madison et. al., Impact of Bankruptcy on Real Estate Transactions,
2 LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 13:38 (2009).
17. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:31.
18. Id.
19. Id. (“More than one property may be operated if the lender is securitizing loans
on all of the properties. If the borrower wishes to sell or change management of one of
the properties this would be a ‘defeasance,’ which requires the approval of the lender or
may be provided for in the agreement.”).
20. Id.
21. GIBBS ET AL., supra note 4, § 7:4.
22. Saft, supra note 3.
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voluntary bankruptcy petition.23 Therefore, the independent director
requirement protects the lenders’ interests by shielding the SPE from
complete control of the parent company’s board of directors.
Rating agencies assign credit ratings for issuers of certain types of
debt obligations and for the debt instruments themselves. These agencies
set the requirements as to who can be considered an independent
director. Typically, an independent director must not:
(1) [H]ave a direct or indirect legal or beneficial interest in the
borrower or any of its related entities; (2) be a substantial creditor,
customer, supplier, employee, or other person that derives any of its
purchases or revenues from the borrower or its related entities; (3) be
a member of the immediate family of any member, manager,
creditor, customer, supplier, employee or other person that derives
any of its purchases or revenues from the borrower or its related
entities; or (4) be a person or entity controlling or under common
24
control of anyone referred to in items one through three.

B. WHY HAVE A SPE?
SPEs are intended to address two primary issues. First, through
their separate structure and bankruptcy remote provisions, SPEs aim to
minimize the risk of the commercial borrower of a securitized loan
becoming the subject of a bankruptcy case (“Borrower Bankruptcy
Risk”).25 This includes the risk of a corporate parent or affiliate’s
financial problems spreading to the borrower and the risk of the
borrower itself enduring financial difficulty.26 The effectiveness of a
SPE’s ability to reduce Borrower Bankruptcy Risk was tested by the
court in General Growth Properties, discussed infra in Part III of this
Note.
Second, SPEs are intended to minimize the risk that the assets of a
borrower will become substantively consolidated with those of a related

23. STANDARD & POOR’S LEGAL CRITERIA FOR STRUCTURED FINANCE
TRANSACTIONS (Apr. 2004), available at www.mbaa.org%2Ffiles%2FresourceCenter
%2FRegAB%2FRegABLegalCriteriaforStructuredFinance%28S%26P%29.pdf&ei=9f
UnT5PfEKfq0gHbxZDsAg&usg=AFQjCNGbIICKrE1Gk3Cu__pfzxHffOq8Pw&sig2=
nMqHZ6NVkRBBrlZvgjkNgA.
24. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:33.
25. GIBBS ET AL., supra note 4, § 7:3.
26. Id.
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corporate entity (“Substantive Consolidation Risk”).27 Loan issuers and
rating agencies often insist that single borrowers or property specific
groups set up a SPE in order to securitize a loan to protect the creditors
from the risk of the SPE being substantively consolidated.28 If the
bankruptcy filings of a SPE and related entity are substantively
consolidated by the bankruptcy court, the assets and liabilities of the
different entities will be consolidated and dealt with as if they were a
single entity that held all the assets and incurred all the liabilities.29 The
process of substantively consolidating the assets and liabilities of the
SPE with the related entity will delay any quick resolution to the
bankruptcy case, and may also prevent the lender from realizing on its
collateral.30 This is because even if the SPE is not itself the subject of a
bankruptcy filing, the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to authorize a
temporary restraining order or injunction that will prevent any creditor
from exercising its collection or enforcement efforts.31 Further, section
362 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic stay to prevent
the SPE and its creditors from foreclosing on assets of the debtor.32
Substantive Consolidation Risk is discussed infra in Part II of this Note.
Bankruptcy remote structures also protect creditors if the SPE does,
in fact, file for bankruptcy through certain procedural advantages.
Section 362(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, added as part of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, provides for lifting of the automatic
stay in a “single asset real estate” case unless within 90 days of the filing
of bankruptcy the debtor has either filed a reorganization plan that has a
reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time, or
has commenced monthly payments of post-petition interest to the
mortgagee at a current fair market rate on the value of the creditor’s
interest in the real estate.33 However, if the SPE has included covenants
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:35.
Id.
GIBBS ET AL., supra note 4, § 7:3.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (2006).
In the 1994 amendments, Congress limited the applicability of expedited relief
from a stay by defining four components of “single asset real estate”: (1) a single
property or project; (2) that generates substantially all of the debtor’s gross income; (3)
on which the debtor conducts no substantial business aside from operating the real
property; and (4) having aggregate non-contingent, liquidated secured debts of less than
$4 million. Steven H. Felderstein & Joan S. Huh, Single Asset Real Estate Cases, 30th
Annual Current Developments in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 905 PLI/COMM 37 (citing
11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (1994)).
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to preserve the SPE as a single asset, single purpose borrower, the SPE
may be subject to accelerated procedures for purposes of lifting the stay,
giving an advantage to the secured lender.34 Courts may also be more
willing to enforce stay waivers in pre-petition workout agreements
involving single asset debtors.35
II. CHALLENGES TO THE SPE STRUCTURE AND LENDER RISKS
A. CHALLENGES TO THE SPE STRUCTURE
1. Recharacterization: What is a “True Sale” Versus a Secured
Loan?
Although the structure of a SPE is designed to isolate assets, the
legal separateness of an SPE can be challenged in bankruptcy court by
the trustee or debtor in possession (“DIP”). Challenges to the
separateness of the SPE’s structure are often based on the notion that the
SPE is not in fact separate from the transferor.36 Depending on the
precautions taken by the transferor in setting up the sale transaction
(discussed in detail below), the court may find that instead of a true sale
of assets, the sale transaction was a step transaction, or simply a loan,
and therefore the assets are still part of the transferor’s estate under
section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code.37 If the assets are deemed to be part
of the transferor’s estate, their value will be disbursed to creditors of the
transferor, rather than the SPE’s lenders.38
Case law reveals a significant number of factors that bear on the
question of whether a transaction is legally a loan or a “true sale,” and
usually no single factor is determinative.39 State law determines whether
a transaction is a true sale or a secured loan; and courts look to the
parties’ intentions and the facts and circumstances of the transaction
including the practices, objectives, and relationship between parties.40 In
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Madison et al., supra note 16.
Id. § 13:10.
Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:38.
11 U.S.C. § 541.
See id. § 541(a).
Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:38 (discussing risk of recharacterization of
transaction as not a true sale).
40. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:38 (citing In re Golden Plan of Cal., Inc., 829
F.2d 705, 708-09 (9th Cir. 1986)); see Redic v. Gary H. Watts Realty Co., 762 F.2d
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addition to the parties’ intent, courts have focused on the extent to which
the risks and benefits associated with ownership have been retained or
transferred.41 Courts look to the level of recourse that the SPE has
against the seller for repayment of the purchase price of the assets. In a
“true sale” the buyer is taking full credit risk on the payment.42 Where
the buyer has direct recourse to the transferor (the seller), the buyer has
the right to collect from the seller any amount that is not paid, indicating
the transaction is intended to be a loan rather than a true sale.43 The
more recourse the SPE has available, the more likely it is that the
transaction will be viewed as a loan.
In determining whether a challenged sale transaction is a “true sale”
or a loan, courts may also consider whether there are disproportionate
reserves, which party controls collection on accounts, which party
controls the sale proceeds, whether parties abided by formal accounting
procedures, whether the buyer purchased specific assets as opposed to
an undivided interest in a blind pool of assets, whether excise and ad
valorem taxes have been paid by the buyer, whether the buyer has the
right to resell the assets, and the reasonableness of the purchase price.44
If the sale transaction is re-characterized from a true sale to a loan
from the transferor to the SPE, or a security interest, and the transfer of
assets was not perfected under Article 9 of the U.C.C., then the SPE
holds the assets as an unperfected security interest, avoidable under
section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and section 9-317 of the U.C.C.,
and the SPE becomes an unsecured creditor in the transferor’s pool of
creditors.45 If the transfer was perfected, as most rating agencies require,
the SPE’s investors would be secured creditors with a higher priority,
meaning they are more likely to get repaid in the cascade of
distribution.46
In a bankruptcy of the transferor, courts have great latitude in
determining whether the transferred assets were truly sold to the SPE, or
if instead they are part of the transferor’s estate. Bankruptcy courts have
1181, 1185-86 (4th Cir. 1985); Major’s Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602
F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Carolina Utils. Supply Co., 118 B.R. 412 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1990).
41. Id.
42. John F. Hilson, Asset-Based Lending: A Practical Guide to Secured Financing,
2010 PRACTISING LAW INST. § 2:5.3.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45.
See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2006); U.C.C. § 9-317 (2000).
46. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:40.
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broad powers under section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code and have the
ability to broadly interpret the definition of the “estate” of a debtor
under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. In In re LTV Steel Co., the
court held that the debtor was entitled to use cash collateral that had
been transferred to two SPEs of the debtor, which had been formed to
purchase the accounts and inventory of the debtor.47 The case involved a
loan originator that had filed for bankruptcy and challenged its own
securitization by asserting that it had not “truly” sold all of its assets to
a bankruptcy remote SPE.48 This assertion was made even though the
debtor, LTV, had agreed to and benefited from the securitization.49
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, LTV and its creditor, Abbey
National, entered into a securitization transaction.50 LTV created a
wholly-owned subsidiary SPE known as LTV Sales Finance Co. LTV
then entered into an agreement with the SPE, which purported to sell all
of LTV’s rights and interests in its accounts receivables on a continuing
basis.51 Abbey National agreed to loan $270 million to the SPE in
exchange for the SPE granting Abbey National a security interest in the
receivables.52 Subsequently, LTV filed a petition in Chapter 11. The
SPE was not in bankruptcy. Nevertheless, LTV filed a motion seeking
an interim order permitting it to use cash collateral.53 This cash collateral
consisted of the receivables and inventory that were owned by the
SPE.54 LTV stated to the court that it would be forced to shut its doors
and cease operations if it did not receive authorization to use the cash
collateral.55
LTV argued that despite the intent and the language of the
securitization documents, it still owned the securitized assets.56
However, the entire premise of a securitization facility is that the
securitized assets have been transferred to the SPE and the assets are no
longer LTV’s “collateral.”57 In fact, a debtor’s request to “use” that
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
See id. at 279-82.
See id. at 285.
Id. at 280.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:39.
Id.
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collateral presupposes that the debtor still owns such assets.58 After an
emergency hearing, the bankruptcy court permitted LTV to use the
securitized assets on an interim basis, and granted the SPE a senior lien
in inventory and receivables generated post-petition by LTV.59
The court explained that the “Debtor has at least some equitable
interest in the inventory and accounts that were a product of its labor,
and that this interest is property of the Debtor’s estate . . . sufficient to
support the entry of the interim cash collateral order.”60 The court was
satisfied that without entry of the interim order, LTV would have been
immediately forced to cease its business operations.61 Such an
occurrence would have eliminated LTV’s chance to reorganize its
business and would have had dire consequences for LTV’s employees,
customers, and creditors. Considering the potential effect of ending the
debtor’s business, the court held that the general equities of the situation
“highly favored the debtor.”62 This decision has been heavily criticized
as an insufficient basis for the court’s determination that the debtor
retained any interest in the transferred property, as the court failed to
consider the relevant facts or legal principles applicable to such a
determination.63 Ironically, in a later Stipulation and Order by the court
which resolved the parties’ dispute, the court ordered that the transfers at
issue constituted “true sales.”64
LTV Steel Co. was factually unusual in that the transferor
challenged its own securitization, which is generally inconsistent with a
transferor’s interests.65 Nonetheless, the court’s approach to the true sale
issue is significant. In LTV Steel Co., the court was influenced by the
fact that use of the cash collateral was essential to the survival of the
business and jobs of its thousands of employees.66 This shows the
importance of DIP financing as an exit strategy in securitization.67

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 281.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 286.
Hilson, supra note 42, § 2:5.3 n.31.
Id.
See generally Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future
of Security, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655, 1698 (2004).
66. In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 284.
67. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:39.
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Further, where a debtor retains substantial risk in asset securitization, the
court may recharacterize the transaction as a secured loan.68
2. Substantive Consolidation
Substantive consolidation is the pooling of the assets and liabilities
of technically distinct corporate entities.69 For purposes of distribution in
bankruptcy, substantive consolidation treats multiple entities as if they
were one.70 If the transferor files for bankruptcy, the transferor’s
creditors may argue for substantive consolidation. The transferor’s
creditors want the estate to be as valuable as possible to maximize their
recovery.71 Substantive consolidation of the SPE and transferor
increases the amount of assets to be divided up among the transferor’s
creditors.72 Substantive consolidation is likely to occur where the debtor
makes payments out of the ordinary course of business, pledges
additional or substitute collateral (with value in excess of the released
collateral) or if the borrower transfers collections to the SPE.73
In In re Augie/Restivo Baking Company, Ltd., the Second Circuit
set out what has become the widely followed standard for when
substantive consolidation is appropriate.74 The court identified two
critical concerns that should be addressed: (1) “whether creditors dealt
with the entities as a single economic unit and ‘did not rely on their
separate identity in extending credit’” 75 and (2) “whether the affairs of
the debtors are so entangled that consolidation will benefit all
creditors.”76 The Second Circuit has since further developed this
68. T. Randall Wright, Bankruptcy Issues in Partnership and Limited Liability
Company Cases, SR056 ALI-ABA 1201 (2010).
69. See generally 5 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE 3D § 21:3 (2008).
70. William L. Norton, Jr., Joint Administration, Procedural Consolidation, and
Substantive Consolidation of Cases (Code § 302(b)), 2 NORTON, supra note 69, § 21:3.
71.
See generally 2 NORTON, supra note 69, § 21:3 (discussing substantive
consolidation).
72. Id.
73. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:37.
74. Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo
Baking Co., Ltd.), 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988); see also In re Raymond Professional
Group, Inc., 438 B.R. 130, 138 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010); In re The Lodge at Big Sky,
LLC, 454 B.R. 138, 142 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2011); In re Murray Indus., Inc., 119 B.R.
820, 829 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
75. Id. at 518 (citing 5 Collier on Bankruptcy 1100-33).
76. Id. at 518.
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standard to include consideration of (1) whether the related entities have
assumed each other’s contractual obligation; (2) whether there is a
sharing of overhead, management, accounting, and other related
expenses between the entities; (3) the existence of intercompany loan
guarantees; (4) a failure to respect corporate formalities when shifting
funds between entities; (5) inadequate capitalization of a subsidiary; (6)
a parent corporation owning all or a majority of the subsidiary’s capital
stock; and (7) whether the related entities have common directors,
officers, and business locations.77 These factors illustrate the importance
of separateness in a SPE asset securitization in order to ensure that the
court will honor the independence of the SPE.
3. Fraudulent Conveyance/Avoidable Preference
Other potential challenges to the sale transaction include: (1) that
the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance avoidable under section 548 of
the Bankruptcy Code or (2) that the SPE was a creditor and the transfer
was an avoidable preference under section 547.78 Avoidance suits can be
detrimental to a SPE securitization because if a transfer of assets is
avoided as a fraudulent transfer or preference, the assets will not be
available to make timely payments to the investors.79
A fraudulent conveyance, which is avoidable under the Bankruptcy
Code or applicable state law, is a viable attack against a SPE when the
purchase price paid by the borrower is less than the reasonably
equivalent value of the assets, and when the transferor is insolvent or
financially distressed at the time of the transfer.80 If the rating agency
determines that there is a risk of a fraudulent conveyance, it will
generally require a “fraudulent conveyance opinion” to the effect that
the transfer and the related payments to the holders of the rated
securities would not be recoverable as a fraudulent transfer under
section 548 or applicable state law.81 In defending against a fraudulent
conveyance action, Bankruptcy Code section 550(b) provides protection
77. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:35 (citing In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp.,
Inc., 138 B.R. 723, 764 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); Committee on Bankruptcy and Corp.
Reorganizations of the Bar of City of New York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50
BUS. LAW. 527, 558 (1995); Malcolm S. Dorris, Problem Cases in Bankruptcy, 747
PLI/Comm 395, 418–419 (1996)).
78. Id. § 56:27.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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for a good faith transferee to the extent of the value given and is
applicable whether or not the transferee is a creditor.82 In determining
whether the transferee acted in good faith, courts generally apply an
objective test, which asks whether the transferee knew or reasonably
should have known of the debtor’s insolvency or of his fraudulent
intent.83
A preferential transfer may also be avoided by a trustee in
bankruptcy when a debtor made a transfer within 90 days, or for an
insider, one year on account of antecedent debt while the debtor was
insolvent.84 A payment is “on account of an antecedent debt” if the debt
owed the creditor was incurred before the transfer of the debtor’s
property was made.85 This could be a problem if the SPE’s transferor
becomes a debtor and has made transfers to the SPE within the
prescribed period prior to the transferor’s bankruptcy.86 Preference
attacks are likely to occur when debt payments were made outside the
ordinary course of business or when there was a pledge of additional
collateral or substitute collateral having a value in excess of released
collateral.87 If the rating agency determines that there is a preference risk
in connection with a transfer of assets, it will generally request a
“preference opinion” from an independent attorney to the effect that the
payments to the holders of the rated securities would not be recoverable
as a preference.88
In defending against a preference action, available defenses under
section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code include the contemporaneous
new value exception, the ordinary course of business exception and the
subsequent new value exception.89 Under the “contemporaneous
82.
83.

11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (2006).
W. Homer Drake, Jr., Property Recovered by the Trustee, BANKR. PRAC. FOR
GEN. PRACTITIONER § 5:15 (2010).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
85. See, e.g., In re Tanner Family, LLC, 556 F.3d 1194, 1196 (11th Cir. 2009)
(noting that a payment made to terminate a lease is a payment made on account of
antecedent debt because the obligation to pay future rent under the lease arose at the
time the lease was signed).
86. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:37.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Other defenses to a preference action include: Enabling Loan Exception;
Floating Lien Exception; Statutory Lien Exception; Domestic Support Exception; Small
Preference Exception; and Consumer Debt Repayment Plan Exception. 11 U.S.C. §
547(c) (2006).
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exchange for new value exception,” the trustee may not avoid a transfer
if: “(1) the transferee . . . extended new value to the debtor in exchange
for the payment or transfer; (2) the exchange of payment for new value
[was] intended by the debtor and transferee to be contemporaneous; and
(3) the exchange [was] in fact substantially contemporaneous.”90 The
rationale for this exception is that because new value is given, a
contemporaneous exchange does not diminish the debtor’s estate.91 In
determining whether the transfer was made in the ordinary course of
business between the parties, the court applies a subjective test,
considering factors such as the timing, amount, and manner of
payment.92
In order to benefit from the “new value” defense, the creditor must
establish that it provided new value to the debtor after the preferential
transfer, which was (1) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable
security interest; and (2) on account of which new value the debtor did
not make an otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such
creditor.93 The theory behind this exception is that, when the creditor
who received the preferential payment subsequently extends new value,
the creditor has essentially returned the preference to the estate, so long
as the debtor does not pay the creditor for that new value and does not
give the creditor a security interest in exchange for it.94
B. LENDER RISKS IN BANKRUPTCY REMOTE STRUCTURING
A lender’s involvement in bankruptcy remote structuring can entail
several risks for the lender. First, the lender’s involvement in the sale
transaction may cause it to be considered an “insider” which would
extend the look-back period in which a DIP or trustee can avoid the
transaction as a preference.95 Further, the bankruptcy court may invoke
its equitable power to subordinate the lien of the secured creditor who
interfered with the debtor’s business to the detriment of other creditors.96
Equitable subordination is a doctrine which provides that for purposes of
90.
91.
92.

See id. § 547(c)(1).
In re JWJ Contracting Co., Inc., 371 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004).
Drake, Jr., supra note 83, § 5:13 (citing In re First Jersey Secs., Inc., 180 F.3d
504 (3d Cir. 1999)); In re Pillowtex Corp., 427 B.R. 301 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010)).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (2006).
94. Drake, Jr., supra note 83, § 5:13 (2010) (citing In re Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc.,
317 B.R. 423 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004)).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(C)(v).
96. Madison et al., supra note 16, §§ 13:38, 12:17.
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distribution, the bankruptcy court may, after notice and a hearing,
subordinate all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another
allowed claim, or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of
another allowed interest.97
A claim is likely to be equitably subordinated where the lender
becomes too intimately involved in the affairs of the debtor or seeks
otherwise to take unfair advantage of other creditors. Under these
circumstances the court will order the lender’s claims to be subordinated
to the claims of other creditors.98
In other words, equitable subordination may be applied by the court
where the lender engages in some inequitable conduct that results in
injury to other creditors or an unfair advantage to the lender. If the
lender designates an independent director to serve on the SPE’s board,
the lender’s involvement might trigger lender liability consequences for
excessive control.99 Further, if the lender is considered an insider, the
risk of equitable subordination is more likely.100 This is because for
inside creditors, the court uses a somewhat lower standard to establish
inequitable conduct warranting subordination.101
Another risk to the lender stems from the possibility of the lender’s
designated director breaching his or her fiduciary duties to the SPE
when the independent director acts in the best interest of the lender, but
contrary to the best interests of the SPE. This risk was addressed by the
court in Kingston Square, discussed infra in Part III of this Note.
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF BANKRUPTCY REMOTE PROVISIONS
As discussed earlier, bankruptcy remote provisions are generally
part of the SPE structure to protect investors by ensuring that they get
paid on time.102 If the transferor, or the SPE itself were to file for
97.
98.
99.
100.

11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2006).
Hilson, supra note 42, § 12:6.6.
Madison et al., supra note 16, § 13:38.
See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 744 (6th Cir. 2001)
(“[W]hen reviewing equitable subordination claims, courts impose a higher standard of
conduct upon insiders.”); In re Herby’s Foods, Inc., 2 F.3d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 1993)
(“[I]f the claimant is an insider, less egregious conduct may support equitable
subordination”); In re Interstate Cigar Co., 182 B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(“[C]ourt gives ‘special scrutiny’ to [an insider’s] transactions with the Debtor”).
101. See id.
102. See infra Part I.B.
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bankruptcy, the investors would likely be at risk of not getting paid on
time or in the full amount.103 This risk is more significant where the
transferor has control over the SPE or its downstream affiliated
entities.104 The SPE cannot be prohibited from voluntarily filing for
bankruptcy, however, the independent director requirement limits this
risk. Even if the SPE does not voluntarily file a bankruptcy petition, the
SPE can be forced into bankruptcy by creditors forcing it to file an
involuntary petition.105 However, rating agencies minimize the risk of
involuntary filings by limiting the debt the SPE can incur and requiring
prompt payment.106
A. BANKRUPTCY REMOTE PROVISIONS FAILURE TO PROTECT
AGAINST AN INVOLUNTARY PETITION
Despite rating agencies’ preventative measures, bankruptcy remote
SPEs can still be involuntarily forced into bankruptcy by creditors. This
was illustrated in Kingston Square, where a SPE’s creditors forced the
bankruptcy remote SPE into bankruptcy by filing an involuntary petition
against it.107 In Kingston Square, the bankruptcy court appointed a
trustee to administer the estates of various limited partnership and
corporate debtors in connection with two failed commercial real estate
securitization transactions.108 In each instance, the debtors used
bankruptcy remote provisions coupled with mortgage-backed
securitization.109 When implemented together, bankruptcy became
unavailable to the defaulting borrower without the affirmative consent
of the mortgagee’s designee on the borrower’s board of directors.110 The
appointed director for each debtor corporation or corporate general
partner was a former attorney who had worked for an affiliate of the
lender and whose director compensation after default was paid by the
lender.111
Upon default of the mortgages underlying the securitization
interest, the trustee, on behalf of the investors, began to foreclose on the
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
See supra Parts I.A, I.B.
11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006); Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:52.
Id.
In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Id. at 738.
Id. at 716.
Id.
Id. at 716-17.
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mortgages.112 In response to the foreclosures on the debtors’ underlying
assets, the SPE, in an effort to circumvent an independent manager’s
refusal to authorize a bankruptcy filing, allegedly recruited creditors to
file an involuntary petition against itself.113 Although the bylaws for
each debtor required the unanimous consent of the board of directors in
order to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition, this structure was evaded
by solicitation of the debtors’ creditors who invoked the involuntary
petition.114
The debtors’ lenders moved to dismiss the case pursuant to section
1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which, among other things, requires
that insolvency petitions not be filed in bad faith.115 Even though the
Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly require that a Chapter 11 petition
be filed in good faith, many courts have developed a “bad faith”
standard where the bankruptcy court may dismiss a petition at the
inception of the case.116 The lenders argued that the SPE’s alleged
recruitment of and collusion with the petitioning creditors constituted
bad faith warranting dismissal of the petition. Observing that the Second
Circuit requires an additional finding of “objective futility” in using the
reorganization process, the court denied the motion to dismiss.117 Judge
Brozmon concluded that the unsecured creditors’ “reasonable belief that
they could reorganize” suggested “they were not acting in bad faith” in
filing the petition.118 The court agreed that the debtors’ collusion with
petitioning creditors was “suggestive of bad faith” but found that the
debtors’ primary motive was to preserve the value of the debtors’ estate
for their creditors.119
As an additional matter, while the involuntary petition was
orchestrated in contravention of the spirit of agreement between the
secured investors and the general partner, the court concluded that the
filing was justified by gross malfeasance by the board in fulfilling its
fiduciary obligations to the company’s stakeholders.120 Specifically, the
court addressed the lender’s designated director’s lack of independence
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 717.
Id. at 719-23.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 724-25.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 734-36.
Id. at 737.
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as one of the mitigating factors against dismissal. The court noted that
the director failed to take any action or to inform himself about what
was happening after he learned of the commencement of foreclosure.121
This inaction was characterized by the court as a breach of fiduciary
duty to the stakeholders, as well as to general creditors of the insolvent
debtor.122 Further, a breach of fiduciary duty, if attributed to the lender,
could give rise to an affirmative claim for damages.
Kingston Square can be read narrowly to conclude that an
independent director must be truly independent or read broadly to hold
that corporate formalities can be overlooked if there is a reasonable
opportunity to reorganize.123 The case raises issues of whether directors
owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders of a SPE, unsecured trade creditors
and professionals, or bondholders/investors, but it does not decide how
these conflicts should be addressed.124 Nonetheless, it is arguable that
the bankruptcy remote provisions of a SPE should be enforced to
prevent voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy orchestrated by a transferor
as the transferor has obtained the benefit of the securitization with full
knowledge of the bankruptcy remote provisions.125
B. BANKRUPTCY REMOTE PROVISIONS FAILURE TO PROTECT
AGAINST A VOLUNTARY PETITION
As seen in Kingston Square, while bankruptcy remote provisions in
the SPE structure may reduce Borrower Bankruptcy Risk, they do not
eliminate such risk entirely. A subsequent case, General Growth
Properties, Inc., (“GGP”), illustrates how bankruptcy remote provisions
can fail to protect an SPE from a voluntary bankruptcy filing.126 In GGP,
the Southern District of New York held that the Chapter 11 filings of
certain SPEs were not bad faith and that the SPEs were eligible for

121.
122.

Id. at 736.
Madison et al., supra note 16, § 13:38 (citing In re Kingston Square Assocs.,
214 B.R. at 736).
123. Sheryl A. Gussett, A Not-So-Independent Director in a Bankruptcy Remote
Structure, 1998 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24.
124. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:52 (citing Robert Dean Ellis, Securitization
Vehicles, Fiduciary Duties, and Bondholders’ Rights, 24 J. CORP. L. 295, 324 (1999))
(seeming to uphold the general principle of providing fiduciary protections to creditors
in times of financial distress, but condemning the board’s failure to uphold its duties to
all stakeholders).
125. Id.
126. In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc. (GGP), 409 B.R. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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bankruptcy despite being set up as bankruptcy remote. In GGP, secured
lenders (the “Lenders”) filed motions to dismiss against five subsidiaries
of GGP that were included in GGP’s Chapter 11 filing.127 GGP was a
publically traded real estate investment trust and the ultimate parent of
750 wholly owned debtor and non-debtor subsidiaries, joint ventures
and affiliates.128 GGP’s group portfolio primarily consists of more than
200 shopping centers in 44 states across the country. 129 GGP had $18.27
billion in mortgage and debt secured by properties of which $1.83
billion was the subject of the motions to dismiss.130 GGP had typically
satisfied its capital needs through mortgage loans from banks and
insurance companies, and from the commercial mortgage backed
securities (“CMBS”) market.131 The typical mortgage loan had a three to
seven year term with a low amortization and a large balloon payment at
maturity.132 Failure to repay or refinance the debt by the repayment date
would result in hyper-amortization, meaning a steep interest rate
increase, a requirement for approval of expenditures by the lender,
and/or a requirement that the cash be kept at the project level with any
excess applied to the principal of the mortgage.133 GGP generally
refinanced debts before the repayment date to avoid the possibility of
hyper-amortization.134
By the end of 2008, as the credit crisis hit and the CMBS market
became increasingly volatile, GGP was unable to refinance its maturing
debt.135 Nor could GGP sell any of its assets in an attempt to pay down
the debt, largely because potential purchasers were also having trouble
finding the necessary financing.136 Due to this financial hardship, GGP
began using its operating cash flow to pay its regular expenses, leaving
GGP unable to meet prior financial obligations.137 Many of GGP’s loans

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 49-51.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 53-54.
Id.
Id. at 54.
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went into default, and foreclosure proceedings were commenced relating
to some of the defaulting loans.138
GGP filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code on April 16, 2009.139 GGP had set up several SPEs as
part of its corporate structure, and these entities, (the “Subject Debtors”)
were included in its bankruptcy filing. Each of the Subject Debtors was
structured with operating agreements that required the consent of the
SPE’s independent managers before the filing of a bankruptcy
petition.140 Immediately prior to the bankruptcy filings, GGP had
replaced two of the independent managers from one SPE.141 The new
independent managers voted in favor of the bankruptcy filing.142 Despite
GGP and the Subject Debtors having positive cash flow and positive
performance as of the date of filing, GGP believed that its capital
structure had become unmanageable to service the $18.4 billion debt
due to mature in 2012 because of the collapsing CMBS market.143
1. Development of the Bad Faith Standard
The Lenders filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Subject
Debtors’ petitions should be dismissed as having been filed in bad
faith.144 Under the equitable doctrine of “bad faith,” a court is authorized
to dismiss a bankruptcy petition where there is no reasonable likelihood
that the debtor intends to reorganize and no reasonable probability that it
would eventually emerge from bankruptcy proceedings.145 The GGP
court relied on the standard set forth in Kingston Square which had held
that a bankruptcy petition will be dismissed for bad faith if both
objective futility of the reorganization process and subjective bad faith
in filing the petition are found.146 Under Kingston Square, no one factor
138.
139.

Id.
The case was procedurally consolidated, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 1015(a), meaning that two or more petitions in the same
bankruptcy court against the same debtor are merged to allow the administration of a
unitary estate.
140. GGP, 409 B.R. at 62.
141. Id. at 67.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 54-55.
144. Id. at 47.
145. Id. at 56 (citing C-TC 9th Ave. P’ship v. Norton Co. (In re C-TC 9th Ave.
P’ship), 113 F.3d 1304, 1309-10 (2d Cir. 1997)).
146. Id. at 56 (citing In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, 725 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
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is determinative of bad faith and the court must base its decision on the
totality of circumstances of the debtor’s financial condition and
motives.147
The GGP court further discussed the evolution of the “bad faith”
doctrine. It noted that when Congress adopted the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), it
strengthened provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1112 to dismiss or convert a
Chapter 11 case, but did not expressly provide a bad faith provision.148
Congress also amended Bankruptcy Code § 1121(d) to shorten
bankruptcy cases, omitting a requirement that the court hold a hearing
on the debtor’s good faith.149 The court reasoned that Congress’
omission in requiring a good faith hearing is consistent with the Code’s
provisions to leave the debtor in possession, and incentivizing the debtor
to file early in order to preserve the debtor’s estate.150
The Lenders argued that the Subject Debtors’ bankruptcy cases
should be dismissed because they prematurely sought bankruptcy
protection and because the prospect of liability on their debt was
speculative.151 The prematurity argument was based on the fact that the
petitions were filed before the balloon payments on many of the SPEs’
three to seven year loans had become due, and before the loans were in
default.152 The Lenders also argued bad faith based on the Subject
Debtors’ decision to file for relief without attempting to negotiate with
the Lenders.153 The Lenders claimed that they could veto any plan the
Subject Debtors proposed, so that no reorganization would be
possible.154
The court disagreed with these arguments, explaining that the
Subject Debtors carry enormous fixed debt that was neither contingent
nor speculative as it was set to mature at a fixed date.155 Further, the
Subject Debtors and GGP were in financial distress at the time of the
filing.156 Four of the Subject Debtors had either cross defaulted to the
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 56.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 60 & n.30.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 57.
Id.
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defaults of other GGP affiliates or would soon be in default.157
Additionally, one of the loans had gone into hyper-amortization in 2008
so that interest had increased by 4.26%, with additional mortgage debts
maturing in 2010, 2011, and 2012 that likely faced the same problem.158
Further, the Subject Debtors were either guarantors on maturing loans of
other GGP parties, had property that was collateral for a maturing loan,
or some loans had a high loan-to-value ratio indicating financial
distress.159
The court therefore concluded that it was unnecessary to require the
Subject Debtors to wait for the principal debt payments to become due
before filing for Chapter 11 protection.160 Further, the Bankruptcy Code
does not require that a debtor be insolvent prior to filing bankruptcy, and
therefore a solvency analysis was not required in determining whether
GGP acted in good faith.161
2. Failure to Negotiate/Replacing Independent Directors Not Bad
Faith
The Lenders further argued that the Subject Debtors had acted in
bad faith because they failed to negotiate prior to filing the petition, and
because the independent directors had been fired and replaced weeks
before the bankruptcy petition without notice to the Lenders.162 The
court dismissed this argument on two grounds. First, the Bankruptcy
Code does not require borrowers to negotiate with their lenders before
filing a bankruptcy petition.163 Second, there was no indication that the
Lenders would have been able or willing to refinance or modify the
Subject Debtors’ loans.164 Further, the Subject Debtors presented
evidence establishing that they could not even get the CMBS lenders to
speak with them regarding loan modification or refinancing.165
The court ultimately accepted the Subject Debtors’ decision to
discharge the original independent directors and replace them prior to
bankruptcy. Based on Kingston Square, the GGP Court held that the
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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managers’ replacement was insufficient to warrant dismissal based on
bad faith.166 The GGP Court held that the new independent directors had
expertise and experience in assessing bankruptcy and restructuring
issues that might arise.167 GGP offered testimony that the company did
not disclose the replacement of the independent managers because it
wanted to avoid unwanted publicity about a potential bankruptcy
filing.168 Further, the operating agreements did not require them to
disclose the replacements,.169 As long as the SPE property owner
appointed a replacement that satisfied the standard of independence set
forth in the organizational documents, no notice or consent was required
regarding the secured lenders.170
The court also identified other ways in which the Lenders were
protected. Specifically, it pointed to such mechanisms as adequate
protection, fees and interests if their claims are oversecured, and
protection against substantive consolidation.171 The Lenders’
inconvenience would not justify dismissing a Chapter 11 petition.172
Therefore, the court concluded that the Subject Debtors did not act in
bad faith by filing Chapter 11 petitions without negotiating or by
replacing the independent directors without disclosure.173 This reasoning
suggests that even improper replacement of independent managers
might not be cause for dismissal on grounds of bad faith.174
3. Corporate Family Doctrine
The Lenders also argued that the bankruptcy remote SPE structure
required that each Subject Debtor’s financial distress be analyzed
exclusively, and that the court should only consider the financial
condition of each Subject Debtor independently rather than the entire

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 69.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Id.
Joseph Philip Forte, GGP: Single Purpose Entity or All in the Corporate
Family?, SR048 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1497, 1503 (2010).
171. GGP, 409 B.R. at 69.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 66-68.
174. Jesse Cook-Dubin, New York Bankruptcy Court Topples Contractual Barriers
to Filing Chapter 11: Part II, 28-JAN AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16, 90 (2010).
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condition of the GGP entity.175 The court acknowledged that the SPE
structure was unquestionably intended to insulate the financial position
of each Subject Debtor and to make the prospect of default less likely.176
However, the Subject Debtors had balloon payments due to the Lenders
that would require refinancing in the near future. If the Subject Debtors
were not able to obtain financing and if GGP, the parent entity, did not
come to the SPEs’ rescue, the loans would soon be in default.177 The
court explained that the Lenders had to be aware they were lending to a
company that was part of a larger corporate group, as this was
admittedly part of the reason they chose to extend the loans to the
Subject Debtors.178 Further, lending to a part of a corporate group
entailed both the benefits and detriments of this structure.179 If the ability
of the group to obtain financing became impaired, the financial situation
of the subsidiary would inevitably be impaired.
The few cases on point supported GGP’s position that the interest
of the entire group or company should be considered rather than only
that of the individual debtors.180 The court applied Heisley v. U.I.P.
Engineered Product Corp. (In re U.I.P.), a case involving the
bankruptcy of a steel company with multiple subsidiaries. In Heisley, the
court addressed several debtors’ cases together because “the nature of a
corporate family create[s] an ‘identity of interest’ . . . that justifies the
protection of the subsidiaries as well as the parent corporation.”181
Heisley supports the principle that the corporate family doctrine should
apply when the parts are worth far less than the whole, or when the unity
of interest protects not just the entities, but the underlying asset value.182
Adopting the reasoning set forth in Heisley, GGP held that “financial
distress” for each GGP entity did not have to be determined separately.
The court found that GGP functioned as an integrated operation and that

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc. (GGP), 409 B.R. 43, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 61-62 (discussing Heisley v. U.I.P. Engineered Prods. Corp. (In re U.I.P.
Engineered Prods. Corp.), 831 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1987); In re Mirant Corp., No. 0346590, 2005 WL 2148362 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2005). These cases stand for the
proposition that it is sound business practice for a parent to seek Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection for its wholly owned subsidiaries when such subsidiaries are crucial to the
reorganization plan.
181. GGP, 409 B.R. at 62; In re U.I.P. Engineered Prods., 831 F.2d at 56.
182. Forte, supra note 170, at 1501.
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the nature of its corporate structure created an identity of interest that
justified the protection of the subsidiaries, as well as the parent
corporation.183
The court accepted GGP’s argument that it had to reorganize its
capital structure due to the collapsed CMBS market and its inability to
refinance.184 The Lenders did not explain how billions of dollars in
unsecured debt at the parent levels could be restructured if the cash flow
of the parent continued to be based on the earnings of the subsidiaries
that had debt due in the coming year that they would be unable to repay
or refinance.185 The court would not adopt the Lenders’ argument that
the interests of the subsidiaries and their creditors should be secondary
to those of the parent and its creditors.186 The court was required to take
account of the interests of both the parent company and subsidiaries.187
Further, the GGP board considered each subsidiary individually in
determining whether it should file its own Chapter 11 petition.188
Therefore, because GGP’s filing was found to be proper, the filings of
the Subject Debtors were also justified and necessary to the
reorganization of GGP.
4. The Fiduciary Duties of the Independent Directors
In examining the relative operating agreements, the court noted the
duties expressly enumerated to the independent managers. The operating
agreements provided that the managers (i) were only to consider the
interests of the company, including the company creditors; (ii) that the
unanimous written consent of the managers was required before filling a
bankruptcy petition; and (iii) that the managers had a fiduciary duty of
loyalty and care similar to those of the General Corporation Law of the
State of Delaware.189 Delaware corporate law provides that directors
must consider the interests of shareholders as long as the debtor is
solvent.190 The court found that the provision requiring the independent
director to consider the interests of the company and its creditors
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

GGP, 409 B.R. at 62.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 64.
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conflicted with the provision stating the independent director could only
act in accordance with Delaware corporate law.191
The court held that pursuant to Delaware law and the relative
operating agreements, the duty of the independent directors was not to
prevent the SPEs from filing a bankruptcy petition.192 Instead, the
independent directors had the same duties as non-independent directors
of a Delaware corporation, which is a prima facie duty to act in the
interests of the corporation and its shareholders, not just the secured
lender.193
The court relied on North American Catholic Educational
Programming Foundation Inc. v. Gheewalla, which rejected the
proposition that directors of a Delaware corporation owed a duty to
creditors when operating in the zone of insolvency.194 In Gheewalla, the
Delaware Supreme Court rejected a controversial line of Chancery
Court holdings that had expanded directors’ fiduciary obligations to
include the company’s creditors, not just when the company is insolvent
but any time the company is operating in the “zone of insolvency.”
Based on Gheewalla, the GGP court concluded that an independent
manager of a solvent subsidiary must consider the interests of the parent
company above the creditors in deciding whether to authorize a
bankruptcy filing.195 The court explained that the Lenders were simply
mistaken if they believed the SPEs’ independent managers were
obligated only to protect the secured lenders’ interests.196

IV. GGP AFTERMATH
A. DOES GGP MEAN MORE SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION?
As discussed earlier, SPEs are primarily intended to mitigate the
risk of substantive consolidation.197 Commentators have expressed
growing concern that the GGP decision will make it easier for
bankruptcy remote entities to file for bankruptcy and increase pressure
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id. at 68.
Id. (citing N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930
A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007)).
194. GGP, 409 B.R. at 64 (citing Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 64-65.
197. See infra Part I.B.
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on lenders to agree to the use of their cash collateral.198 The concern is
that permitting a parent company to use cash collateral of its SPE’s
lenders will make the lenders less secure and substantive consolidation
more probable.199 However, a narrow interpretation of GGP will be
unlikely to promote substantive consolidation. The GGP court explained
that “the question of substantive consolidation is entirely different” and
“[n]othing . . . implies that the assets and liabilities of any of the Subject
Debtors could properly be substantively consolidated with those of any
other entity.”200 This reasoning suggests that the court applied a
“corporate family” doctrine treating affiliated companies as a collective
whole engaged in a common enterprise.201 The court did not collapse the
interests of the parent and the subsidiary, as would be the case in
substantive consolidation, but did view the corporate problems as
affecting the entity as a whole.202
Rather than promoting substantive consolidation, GGP’s
application of the corporate family doctrine illustrates how SPE
borrowers, as part of a larger corporate bankruptcy, should be viewed as
part of the corporate family in the bankruptcy process. This is
particularly instructive in the “bad faith” context. In GGP, the court
explained how the credit crisis and current economy have affected
lending practices among SPEs.203 This economic climate created a need
for the court to consider the interests of the corporate family as a
whole.204 The court explained that:
Faced with the unprecedented collapse of the real estate markets, and
serious uncertainty as to when or if they would be able to refinance
the . . . debt, the Debtors’ management had to reorganize the Group’s
capital structure. [Secured lenders] do not explain how the billions of
dollars of unsecured debt at the parent levels could be restructured
responsibly if the cash flow of the parent companies continued to be
based on the earnings of subsidiaries that had debt coming due in a

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
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Dubin, supra note 174, at 91.
Id.
GGP, 409 B.R. at 69.
Forte, supra note 170, at 1500.
GGP, 409 B.R. at 61-62.
GGP, 409 B.R. at 53-55.
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period of years without any known means of providing for
205
repayment or refinance.

Thus, the state of the market is itself a crucial factor warranting a
balancing of the secured creditors’ expectation of the SPE’s durability,
versus the parent and SPE borrowers’ expectations that a refinancing
market would exist.206
B. IF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS CAN BE REPLACED ON THE EVE OF
BANKRUPTCY, ARE THESE PROVISIONS STILL EFFECTIVE?
GGP has also led many market participants to question the
effectiveness of independent director provisions, based on the fact that
in GGP, independent directors were replaced on the eve of the SPEs’
bankruptcy filing.207 However, the court pointed out that the replacement
directors satisfied the Lender’s explicit requirements for
independence.208 While the independent directors have a duty to the
creditors when the SPE is insolvent, the vast majority of SPE debtors are
solvent, meaning this duty runs in favor of equity.209 Going forward,
lenders will be likely to enhance independent director requirements by
ensuring that they receive notice and the opportunity to verify
compliance prior to any director’s removal or replacement.210 However,
too much lender control can lead to additional unwanted lender liability,
as a lender’s excessive control over a borrower’s business can lead to
the lender being liable for the borrower’s debt.211
According to the reasoning set forth in GGP, a subsidiary cannot
contract around the independent directors’ duties to the parent company
while the subsidiary is solvent. Therefore, creditors of a solvent
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 62-63.
Forte, supra note 170, at 1505.
GGP, 409 B.R. at 67-68.
Id. at 68.
Daniel S. Huffenus & Deborah L. Fletcher, The GGP Bankruptcy Cases –
What They Mean for Lenders in COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FIN. 2010: HOW TO
HANDLE DEFAULTS, DISTRESS, MATURITIES, AND STACKS OF DEBT 2010, at 217, 223
(Real Estate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI Order No. 23198, 2010).
210. Id. at 223-24.
211. Id. Under traditional principles of lender liability, “a creditor that has not
assumed the formal indicia of ownership may become liable for the debts of its
borrower if the lender’s conduct is such as to cause it to become the debtor’s agent,
partner, or alter ego.” Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 499 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir.
2007).
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subsidiary cannot avoid limited fiduciary protection. In GGP, the
Lenders had gone to great lengths to attempt to prevent the Subject
Debtors from incurring debt other than to their respective lenders.212
According to the debt-restricting provisions, except when due to
diminution in the value of collateral, a GGP SPE should never be
insolvent if it were to comply with the provisions that prohibit it from
incurring other debt.213 By contrast, independent directors of an
insolvent SPE owe a fiduciary duty to the SPE’s creditors, but directors
of a solvent SPE only owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
shareholders.214 Therefore, the only time an independent director can
consider the lender’s interests is in the rare case where the SPE is
insolvent.215
In GGP, fiduciary requirements proved to be an ineffective source
of lender protection when the independent directors of a solvent SPE
owed a fiduciary duty to the equity holders. These equity holders were
the insolvent GGP parent entity who benefitted from the SPEs’ inclusion
in the bankruptcy process. Because lenders only receive fiduciary
protection when the SPE itself is insolvent, and because application of
the corporate family doctrine in bankruptcy focuses on the interests of
the corporate group as a whole, the parent entity’s interests will almost
always be considered before those of the lender. This fiduciary
limitation may cause lenders to refrain from using the independent
director requirement because its application can seriously negate its
advantages to lenders.
CONCLUSION
Despite recent attacks, SPEs remain a valuable method of
securitization. SPEs can still effectively be bankruptcy remote as long as
proper procedural precautions are followed. Based on GGP, a
borrower’s operating agreement should require independent directors to
consider only the interests of the borrower and its creditors when
considering bankruptcy filings.216 While this kind of limitation may only
be effective while the SPE is insolvent, it will preserve separateness, as
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

GGP, 409 B.R. at 49-50.
Dubin, supra note 174, at 91.
Id.
Id. at 91.
Steven G. Horowitz, Current Issues for Commercial Real Estate Lenders,
SR048 ALI-ABA 1497 (2010).
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well as increase lenders’ fiduciary protection in the zone of insolvency.
The operating agreement should eliminate any fiduciary duty to
members and other affiliates, as permitted under applicable corporate
law.217
Further, the SPE should have corporate governance provisions
which ensure that the SPE is abiding by corporate formalities, such as
(1) maintaining books and records separate from any other related
corporate entities; (2) maintaining separate accounts; (3) making sure
there is no commingling of assets between related corporate entities; (4)
conducting business under the SPE’s name as opposed to that of any
other related entity; (5) maintaining separate financial statements; (6)
paying liabilities out of the SPE’s own funds; (7) maintaining an arm’s
length relationship with affiliates; (8) paying its salaries for its own
employees; (9) not guaranteeing debt of any other entity; (10) not
pledging assets for the benefit of any other entity; (11) not acquiring
obligations or securities of any of its partners; (12) maintaining adequate
capital; and (13) reasonably allocating and sharing overhead costs for
shared office space.218 Even small measures such as using independent
stationary, invoices, and checks can help ensure that the entity’s
separateness will be upheld.219 The transferor and lender should monitor
these provisions in order to help preserve the SPE’s legal structure for
both parties’ advantage.
The creditworthiness of the parent will also play a critical role in
obtaining SPE financing. Despite its separateness, the financial state of
the parent entity inherently affects the financial state of the SPE.
Because of this, lenders are likely to require more underwriting due
diligence.220 Excessive leverage at the parent level or maturity
concentrations among affiliated borrowers might render the parent
susceptible to a failing economy where refinancing is not available.221
The GGP opinion is likely to draw focus to this risk, which could impact
the pricing of subsidiary debt. The more the SPE relies on and is
intertwined with the parent entity and its affiliates, the more likely it is
that financial distress at the parent level will trickle down.

217.
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Lenders can also take action to protect themselves in bankruptcy
remote structuring. To ensure the effectiveness of the independent
director requirement, lenders may require notice prior to the replacement
of the borrower’s independent managers.222 This would increase scrutiny
on any independent director replacements, and may prevent replacement
from occurring solely to the lender’s disadvantage. If possible, the
independent managers should have experience in real estate finance and
insolvency.
Lenders should also consider the advantage of structuring
independent director provisions to ensure that the directors are truly
independent of both the lender and the borrower’s existing principals.223
A director that has been designated by the lender, who acts as a mere
puppet of the lender, runs the risk of breaching fiduciary duties to the
corporation and to third party creditors, and a truly independent director
would mitigate this risk.224 A truly independent director could strictly
abide by his or her corporate fiduciary duties and prevent against the
risk of lender liability due to excessive control. While in the short run
this may appear less favorable to the lender as the lender may not be
able to rely on the director to favor its interests; independence will
lessen the risk that the SPE will make a bad faith decision regarding a
distressed loan.225
Even if the independent director requirements prove to be
ineffective, there are other protective mechanisms available to lenders
that can help protect their interest in the collateral. As long as the
borrower’s assets and liabilities remain strictly separate from those of
the borrower’s affiliates, the goals of bankruptcy remote provisions can
still be served. The transfer of assets should be carefully structured as a
true sale, giving the SPE limited recourse against the transferor for the
asset purchase price.226 Structuring the transfer as a true sale will ensure
that the SPE has maximum protection against any financial distress of
the transferor, and therefore incentivize lending.
Additionally, newly enacted legislation will improve the quality of
lending practices, which will ultimately further protect lenders. Section

222.
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Id. at 223-24.
Madison et al., supra note 16.
Dealing with a Debtor Approaching Bankruptcy, Corporate Practice Series
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941 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), signed into law on July 21, 2010, requires that
lenders now retain a small ownership percentage in the loans they
originate.227 In the past, lenders could sell an entire loan almost
immediately after issuing it, which created a lack of accountability in
issuing the loan and its quality.228 By requiring partial-ownership, the
Dodd-Frank Act gives lenders a business incentive to check the quality
of the asset and make sure it is capable of supporting the loan.229
The immediate effect of this legislation may be to slow recovery of
the CMBS market because of uncertainty as to the requirements,
increased compliance costs, and because money will not be freed up as
quickly.230 However, in the long run, this added incentive will improve
investor confidence and ultimately provide a more efficient lending
market.231
Despite GGP, precautionary structuring and new restrictive
legislation, such as the Dodd-Frank Act, will encourage commercial
lending through bankruptcy remote SPEs. GGP illustrates the effect of a
credit crisis on lending practices and bankruptcy law. The risk of a SPE
being negatively affected by the financial trouble of related corporate
entities cannot be completely avoided.232
The surprising result in GGP was necessary given the undeniable
financial distress of the parent entity and the court appropriately focused
on recovery of the corporate group as a whole. It would be unrealistic to
argue that a corporate parent’s financial distress would not affect its
subsidiary, no matter how separate or remote. Further, recovery of the
corporate group may require a restructuring of all its parts.
Additionally, legislative reform will promote accountability in
lending practices and deter the type of irresponsible lending that largely
contributed to the credit crisis. Therefore, modern concerns need not
diminish the effectiveness of bankruptcy remote provisions. Instead,
GGP emphasizes practical reorganizational challenges that large
corporate entities may face when trying to restructure in a damaged
economy, and how SPE securitization is not immune from these
227. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
228. Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, Facing Today’s Real Estate Issues with Elizabeth
A. Whitman, ACC Docket, 28 No. 9 ACCDKT 94, 96 (2010).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 96.
231. Id. at 97.
232. See infra Part III.B.3.

260

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

challenges. GGP serves as a valuable tool for understanding how to
carefully construct restrictive corporate governance provisions in order
to provide greater lender protection when faced with an uncertain
economy.

